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Abstract One of John Horton’s most original and significant contributions to political
theory is his development and exploration of the political theory of modus vivendi
(MV). I examine what Horton understands a MV to be, what sort of theory he intends
the political theory of MV to be, and why he believes a MV to be the best we can
reasonably hope for. I consider how far his notion of MV matches the reality of
contemporary political systems and whether ‘liberal moralism’ is quite as divorced
from reality or as devoid of practical consequence as his political theory of MV would
have us believe.
Keywords Modus vivendi . Liberalism . Liberal moralism . JohnHorton . JohnRawls .
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JohnHorton ismuch admired by his peers for his fair-mindedness, his sagacity, and his strong
sense of professional obligation. Those qualities have made him everyone’s favourite referee,
assessor and external examiner. His worldly wisdom, breadth of learning, clear-headedness,
and sobriety of judgment are also evident in his work as a political theorist, but, as a political
theorist, he has used those qualities to more controversial effect. Horton is a prominent and
trenchant critic of the dominant form that political theory has assumed during the last four
decades, a period roughly co-extensivewith his own career as a political theorist. He has used
his elegant, measured and carefully modulated prose to deliver a swingeing assault on
contemporary liberal political theory. He is not antipathetic towards a liberal political order.
On the contrary, he is favourably disposed towards that order and also towards the liberal
tradition (2009, 30; 2010a 447; 2011a, 131). His criticism is principally directed at the form
that liberal political theory has taken since the publication of JohnRawls’sATheory of Justice
(1971). That idealised and moralised form of political theory, which Horton brands ‘liberal
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moralism’, runs counter to the scepticism that he himself brings to the study of politics and to
his belief that political theory has to stay close to political reality if it is to have any value.
For those of us who are sympathetic to the endeavours of Rawls and of other liberal
political theorists to deal with the issues raised by pluralism, a particularly irritating feature of
many of the critics is the entirely negative character of their own efforts. They find fault with
liberal thinking but then either walk away from the issues that contemporary liberals are
trying to resolve or pretend that those issues do not exist. Horton is an honourable exception
to that tendency. Indeed, part of his complaint against ‘liberal moralism’ is its failure fully to
recognise how problematic and unamenable is the contemporary pluralism for which it
ostensibly provides. In his own political theory of modus vivendi he has sought to replace
liberal moralismwith an understanding of political life that takes division and dissensus more
seriously and to provide a more realistic account of the sort of rapprochement that division
and dissensus permit.
In this article, I investigate what Horton understands by a modus vivendi (hereinafter
‘MV’), what kind of political theory he intends the political theory of MV to be, and what
leads him to suppose thatMVis the best for which we can realistically hope. I then comment
on how far his notion of MV matches the reality of the contemporary political world,
particularly the reality of political systems whose foundations are not embroiled in dispute,
and consider whether contemporary political philosophy is quite as divorced from reality and
as devoid of practical consequence as his political theory of MV would have us believe.
1 Modus Vivendi
How, then, does Horton understand aMV?AMVassumes a situation of conflict, potential if
not actual (2007, 55; 2011a, 121–4; 2011b, 292–4). The term ‘modus vivendi’ translates
literally as ‘way of living’ but in contemporary political usage it describes a way of living
together that a population has achieved in spite of features of itself that might bring its
members into conflict with one another. Very often that conflict will arise from differences,
such as differences of interest, belief, value, ideology, culture, identity, faith or ethnicity. MV
is most commonly conceived as an arrangement that recognises and provides for differences
of those sorts. But, as Hobbes observed, even a population that possesses identical prefer-
ences can find itself embroiled in conflict if their identical preferences place them in
competition for scarce resources. Thus, even a homogeneous population may need a MV.
Even so, MV is nowadays more commonly associated with difference and is invoked most
frequently as a device for managing the differences that characterise modern societies,
especially when those differences generate ‘deeply divided’ societies.
Horton also associatesMVwith contingency, compromise, particularity and circumstance
(2007, 51–2; 2010a, 441–2; 2011a, 123–7). AnMV describes an arrangement that a number
of parties have negotiated or evolved that enables them to live together peacefully, given their
particular characteristics and differences and given the realities of their particular situation. It
is not the realisation of a general ideal. On the contrary, it will typically be an arrangement that
has been cobbled together in response to the realities inwhich the parties find themselves, and
one that takes advantage of whatever they can find in themselves, in one another and in their
given circumstances that facilitates peaceful coexistence. For all those who are parties to it, a
MVwill be a compromise. MV therefore has a ‘second best’ quality, even though practically
it may be the best that is feasible. We can therefore think of MV as something that, in
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conception, is sandwiched between other sorts of arrangement that are either less than ormore
than itself, and we can get a fix on the idea of MV by considering what it is not.
What order of things, then, falls short ofMV?Horton is clear that an arrangement inwhich
a regime simply tyrannises over and supresses a population, or uses its power to enable one
part of a society to impose its will unilaterally upon another, cannot count as a MV (2010a,
439, 442; 2011a, 124–5, 128). Tyranny or mere domination is at odds with the very idea of
the different parts of a population ‘living together’which the termMVis designed to capture,
even though the life theymake together may be nomore than a political life. Sowhile Horton
associates MV with political realism, he does not associate it with a realism in which just
anything goes and he is as dismissive of ‘false realists’, who pretend that politics is only ever
about power and interest and who valorise brutality and amoralism, as he is of liberal
moralists (2010a, 441–2).
For Horton, consent to, or acceptance of, a MV by the parties to it is crucial to its being a
MV (2007, 52; 2010a, 438–9, 443; 2011a 124–5, 128). AMVembodies compromise and an
arrangement is a compromise only if each of the parties to it concedes something and only if
each agrees to it (Jones and O’Flynn 2013). That feature of MVraises the thorny question of
what is to count as consent or acceptance or agreement. It is part of the political theory ofMV
that we should not set the threshold for meeting these requirements too high. The political
theory of MV stresses that the circumstances for MV are those of disagreement, conflict,
untidiness and complexity, in which all of the parties have to settle for something less than
they would ideally like. They may also have to settle upon aMVunder conditions of duress,
disadvantage and inequality. So the consent or acceptance that Horton requires forMVis very
much less than consent given under conditions of freedom and equality of the sort demanded
by some liberals, at least for theoretical purposes.
While consent or acceptance is therefore a crucial feature of MV, it is consent or
acceptance whose definition remains imprecise (Horton 2010a, 443). In real-world contexts
of the kind Horton means to address, it is hard to be precise about these things, but lack of
precision does not mean there is no contrast to be made. For example, there would be no
justification for describing as a MV the historical treatment of indigenous peoples by settler
populations, in which settlers fought against, suppressed and often eliminated indigenous
populations in large numbers. By contrast, the arrangements that later came to be established
between settler populations and indigenous peoples, and that now obtain in countries like
Canada, Australia andNewZealand, might be reasonably described as aMV, at least in some
instances.
If tyranny and repression sink beneath aMV,what rises above it? How good can aMVbe
before it becomes more than a MV? Horton’s political theory of MV is conceived in
opposition to Rawls’s political conception of justice and especially in opposition to that
conception conjoined to Rawls’s claim that it can become the focus of an overlapping
consensus amongst the different and conflicting comprehensive doctrines that the members
of his model society embrace. So, at its upper end, the notion of MV is to be distinguished
from a society all of whose members regard its arrangements as just and who experience no
conflict between their comprehensive doctrines and their society’s public arrangements. In
Rawls’s just society, ideally conceived, there is no element of compromise or regret for any of
itsmembers, at least in relation to the society’s basic structure and constitutional essentials. All
are thoroughly wedded to the society as a just society and none would wish it to be different.
That Rawlsian ideal is more than a MVand is the sort of ideal that Horton intends his
model of MV to challenge. He rejects Rawls’s ideal not because he finds it undesirable
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or morally wrong but because he believes it unrealistic, impossible, utopian, and so
politically irrelevant (2010a, 433–7; 2011a, 125–7). It demands more than we can ever
reasonably expect given the realities of political life.
Horton does argue, however, that aMVcan bemore and better than the account of it given
by Rawls himself. Rawls (1993, 147–8) understands a MV to rest upon a mere balance of
political forces and to be grounded in nothing more than the self-interest of those who are
party to it. Because it is rooted in self-interest only, each partywill be ready to defect from it as
soon as the balance of forces changes such that adherence to the MV ceases to be to its
advantage all things considered. For that reason, Rawls deems a MV inherently unstable.
Horton, by contrast, insists that a MV need not be constructed only on the basis of
naked self-interest. It can be constructed from whatever the parties bring to the situation
in which they find themselves.
… a modus vivendi can be arrived at by drawing on whatever resources – moral,
intellectual, cultural, pragmatic , etc., as well as self-interest – are available in
helping the parties to reach it. A modus vivendi is not therefore to be understood,
as Rawls does, simply as a balance of political forces. … A modus vivendi is a
practical accommodation that can be built around any number of factors and be
accepted for a variety of reasons [moral as well as prudential] by those who are
parties to it. (2010a, 439–440; see also 2011a, 124, 126–7; 2011b, 295–8.)
However, we need to be careful about just what the claim is here. It is not that,
insofar as people bring moral beliefs or bits of moral belief to the construction of a MV,
they will somehow moralise it from a third party perspective, particularly the perspec-
tive of the political theorist of MV. Rather, Horton’s claim here is entirely instrumental.
It is that the moral beliefs of the parties to a MV, particularly the beliefs they share, may
facilitate its construction and enhance its stability. Insofar as beliefs have this benign
effect, their influence will be welcomed by the political theorist of MVand they should
be welcomed by those who are seeking the MV. But the ‘helpfulness’ of moral beliefs
(or beliefs of other sorts, such as religious or political beliefs) need have nothing to do
with their intrinsic merit as beliefs; nor does their helpfulness hold out the prospect that
a MV might be based on either a single intersubjective morality, or a jointly recognised
objective morality, that removes all need for accommodation and compromise. And, of
course, both moral beliefs and beliefs of other sorts may prove more of a hindrance than
a help in the construction of a MV, since brokering conflicting beliefs is often more
difficult than brokering conflicting preferences or interests (cf. Horton 2011a, 127,
129–32). So Horton’s suggestion that the parties can draw on more than mere
self-interest in constructing a MV does not imply that the MV they construct
will have a more satisfying moral character than the purely self-interested
version that Rawls describes.
It is something else that would seem to give a moral quality to Horton’s version of
MV, which takes us back to the idea of acceptance and, more particularly, to the idea of
legitimacy. Horton says that we can expect, or at least reasonably hope, that the parties
to a MV will come to regard it as legitimate (2010a, 438–40, 443; 2011a, 128). Indeed,
a MV will ordinarily become entrenched in a society’s laws, institutions and constitu-
tion all of which can be deemed legitimate by the society’s members (2010a, 440;
2011a, 125). It is that idea of legitimacy that gives Horton’s MVa normative dimension
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that is absent from Rawls’s version of MV. It is also the parties’ commitment to the
legitimacy of their MV that, along with their experiencing the benefits of MV, provides
the main ground upon which Horton rejects Rawls’s claim that a MV must be unstable
(2007, 49–51; 2010a 439–41).
The introduction of that idea of legitimacy raises the issue of how we are to
distinguish a MV, particularly a good MV, from the kind of ideal Rawls envisages. If
every section of a society endorses the legitimacy of its political arrangements, how
does the society remain fundamentally different in character from Rawls’s just society?
Horton’s requirement of acceptance and his emphasis upon legitimacy do seem to add a
deontological dimension to his notion of MV. If we ask why people would enter into a
MV, given the deep and serious nature of the conflicts between them, Horton’s main
answer is to achieve the goods of peace and security and all the multifarious goods for
which peace and security are preconditions (2007, 54–5; 2010a 438, 444;
2011a, 125). Legitimacy may therefore have only instrumental value for the
political theory of MV: it may matter only if and because it assists in bringing
about and maintaining peace and security.
However, valuing legitimacy only in that way is hazardous, since tyranny and
repression can perform as well as, if not better than, a MV as instruments of peace
and security. That is no mere logical possibility: consider the conflicts that developed in
the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia once the yoke of communist rule
was cast off, or what happened in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam and the
Ba’athist regime, or what has happened and what might yet happen following the
displacement of authoritarian regimes in Libya and Syria. Peace and security are often
achieved more readily, and more effectively and reliably, through a repressive regime
than through a cobbled-together and potentially fragile MV.
Horton may therefore insist on legitimacy as a feature of MV not only for its
instrumental value but also because it is a minimally right requirement. He may hold
that it is wrong and unacceptable that people should have to live under a regime that is
devoid of legitimacy (Horton 2012, 131). But how then does his conception of MV,
particularly MV at its best, differ categorically from Rawls’s ideal? The answer seems
to lie in two related considerations.
One is the question of what it is that renders an arrangement legitimate. Should the
legitimacy of a regime depend upon its intrinsic quality or upon the way in which it is
regarded by its population? The thinking of Rawls and many other liberal philosophers
approximates more closely to the first of these options. Although they often invoke
consent as a condition of legitimacy, their test of legitimacy relates primarily to a
regime’s moral quality. Consent figures as an adjunct to that test – given the quality of
the regime, should it command the consent of a population or would it command their
consent if the population were ‘reasonable’? In other words, the relevant consent is a
consent that people ought to give rather than a consent they actually give. For Horton
(2012), that gets things the wrong way round. The legitimacy of a regime turns on how
it is regarded by its population, although that is not to say that a regime’s legitimacy is
conferred upon it by the consent of its population as ‘consent’ is understood in
voluntarist theories of political legitimacy. Rather, the legitimacy of a regime depends
upon whether it meets the criteria that its population reckon provide the relevant tests
and these tests need not include the population’s own consent, although presumably
they could. So the relevant matter is not so much a population’s consent as, in David
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Hume’s phrase, their ‘opinion of right’ (Hume 1963). Standards of legitimacy will be
embedded in the culture, circumstances and traditions of a population and so will vary
with time and place. Thus, Horton does not hold that legitimacy is conferred upon a
regime only by the consent of those who are subject to it and certainly not by the
individually given consent demanded by Lockean contract theory. Nor does he propose
a single criterion or set of criteria for legitimacy. Even so, for the political theory of MV
itself what makes a MV legitimate is its being deemed acceptable by those who are
party to it. In that sense, if only in that sense, the legitimacy of a MV might be said to
rest upon the ‘consent’ or ‘acceptance’ of those who are subject to it.
A second consideration is that, for Horton, legitimacy is a less demanding and less
precise notion than justice, and a population can accept an arrangement as legitimate
even though they reckon it less than fully just (2010a, 439; 2011a, 128; 2012, 134–7).
That decoupling of justice from legitimacy is essential if there is to remain a clear
distinction between MVand Rawls’s political conception of justice. In a MV the parties
are always less than completely satisfied with their condition. From their point of view,
the MV is always less than fully just or fair and always less than what they really want it
to be or believe it should be, even though they may deem it legitimate. A MV therefore
never fully resolves conflict in the way that Rawls’s political conception of justice
aspires to. While Rawls’s arrangement does not remove conflict amongst people’s
different comprehensive doctrines and their associated conceptions of the good, it does
deal with that conflict in a way that is just and that all citizens, if they are reasonable,
will recognise as just. Thus, unlike the parties to a MV, Rawls’s citizens have no reason
to be less than fully satisfied with their society. However, for Horton, while we may
posit a political condition that is superior to MV, in reality no polity will supersede a
MV: ‘even the best polities will never be entirely just (whatever one’s understanding of
justice)’ and most will have other serious ethical failings (2010c, 163; also 2010a, 438).
Indeed, he doubts ‘that we can even imagine a wholly just liberal state’ (2010a, 436, his
emphasis; see also 2005, 31–3; 2007, 51–2).
2 The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi
That is not to say that Horton regards justice as a matter of no consequence. He does
worry about it and particularly the charge that a MV may be significantly unjust (2007,
52–4). The reassurance he offers is that a MV requires the parties’ acceptance and they
are unlikely to accept their own radically unjust treatment (2010a, 439; 2011a, 128).
But that thought is merely a consolation. A MV does not have to be just and tolerating a
degree of injustice is likely to be a price the parties have to pay to secure a MV. Indeed,
different and clashing conceptions of justice are likely to be part of the very conflict for
which a MV has to provide (2003, 21; 2007, 53–4).
My aim so far has been simply to give a brief overview of the idea of MV as it is
sketched in various of Horton’s writings. That is the order of things presented by his
political theory of MV. But what sort of ‘political theory’ is it? Does Horton intend his
portrait of MV to provide us only with an interpretation of the contemporary political
world that exposes Rawls’s political conception of justice as hopelessly adrift from
reality? Or is its purpose to present and defend a possibility – the possibility that a
coercive and oppressive regime is not the only alternative for a population if it cannot
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come up to the standard set by Rawls’s just society? Does it, in other words, present us
with an ideal, albeit an ideal of an avowedly un-utopian sort? MVmay be more realistic
and therefore less ambitious in aspiration than idealised models of the just society, but it
can still present us with a goal that is achievable and one whose achievement we should
welcome and value. So, rather than merely holding up a mirror to reality, Horton’s
political theory of MV may be no less normative in purpose than the prescriptions of
liberal moralism.
In fact, the normative status of Horton’s MV is less than entirely clear and uncer-
tainty about that status arises at several crucial points in his account. One such point is
the distinction he makes between MV and tyrannous regimes that maintain their
position merely through fear and coercion. Inevitably there is a degree of fuzziness in
the boundary that separates MV from merely repressive regimes, particularly since MV
comes in different degrees and will, like any real political regime, make use of coercion
itself (2011a, 124–5). That fuzziness is not the issue here. There will still be plenty of
cases in which it is clear that a regime falls either above or below the line. But how are
we to understand what is at issue when we make that distinction? Earlier I described a
MV as sandwiched between arrangements that are either ‘more’ or ‘less’ than itself.
That characterisation suggests a normative hierarchy in which MV ranks more highly
than tyrannical or repressive regimes. But it may be no part of Horton’s purpose to
suggest such a hierarchy. He may exclude tyrannies from MV simply because they fall
outside its conceptual limits. If a defining feature of MV is broad acceptance by those
whom the MV governs, a tyranny will not be a MV simply because ‘by definition, a
tyrannical political settlement is not one that is broadly accepted by those subject to it’
(2011a, 128). While it would be odd not to regard a coercive regime as morally inferior
to one that is embraced by those whom it governs, it may be no part of the political
theory of MV to make that sort of judgement. Indeed, the realism that undergirds
Horton’s political theory might allow that there can be circumstances in which a
repressive regime may be the only realistic possibility or, as we noted earlier, circum-
stances in which a repressive regime will deliver the goods of peace and security more
adequately than any MV that is realistically possible in those circumstances.
A similar ambivalence of normative status is apparent when we turn to the related
issue of legitimacy. Horton, as we have seen, treats legitimacy as a central feature of
MV. He insists, of course, that the degree of legitimacy a MV can secure will be
contingent on the circumstances in which it has to be forged and also that we should be
realistic in the standard that we set for legitimacy. But legitimacy would still seem, of
necessity, to be normatively superior to illegitimacy and greater legitimacy to be
preferable to less.
In fact, the concept of legitimacy is itself ambiguous. When we observe that a
regime enjoys legitimacy, we may do so in any entirely empirical or sociological spirit:
we may mean only that the regime is, as a matter of fact, accepted as rightful by its
population. If we use the concept in that way, we need imply nothing about whether the
regime is indeed rightful and ought to be complied with by its population. We merely
note a socio-political fact. Let’s call this ‘empirical legitimacy’. Alternatively, when we
describe a regime as ‘legitimate’, we may do so in a wholly normative spirit: we may
mean to affirm that the regime is indeed rightful and therefore deserving of its
population’s compliance. Let’s call that ‘normative legitimacy’. When Horton describes
a MV as legitimate, or indicates that different MV may enjoy different degrees of
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legitimacy, which of these two senses of legitimacy does he intend? The Kantian and
libertarian accounts of political legitimacy that he opposes are clearly normative in
character and are normative in ways that are quite independent of empirical legitimacy.
Horton, by contrast, aims ‘to restore the connection between political legitimacy and
the beliefs and attitudes of those subject to it’ (2012, 141). For him, the test of a
regime’s legitimacy is whether it is, as a matter of fact, attributed with the right to rule
by those whose regime it is. That test seems to substitute an empirical conception for
the normative conceptions proposed by Horton’s opponents. If it does, it is in harmony
with his desire to substitute realism for moralism. It offers us not merely a theory of
legitimacy that differs substantively from those offered by Kantians and libertarians but
also a different kind of theory – a ‘theory’ that deals with the issue of legitimacy in a
quite different way. It shifts the focus from norms fashioned by political theorists to the
empirical matter of how a regime is conceived by its own population. Once again,
therefore, we have reason to query the normative import of the political theory of MV.
Yet Horton goes on to deny that his account of legitimacy is purely descriptive and
insists that the idea of political legitimacy, in distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate power, is ‘inherently normative’ (2012, 145). It may be therefore that his
account of legitimacy is not only empirical. He may intend the empirical test of
legitimacy also to be the normative test: if, as a matter of fact and for whatever reason,
a population deems its regime to be legitimate, that is reason enough to deem the
regime normatively legitimate. But it cannot be that simple, since Horton also remarks
that there is space in his account ‘for people to be mistaken or deluded about the
legitimacy of their political institutions’ (2012, 145).
This ambivalence on how we are to think of legitimacy in relation to MV bears on its
significance for MV. If the legitimacy relevant to MV is normative, it introduces a
deontological element into MV: the legitimacy that is a necessary feature of MV implies
that MV enjoys a rightness that sub-MV arrangements do not. Our thinking on
legitimacy may have to be tempered by the realities of politics, but it will still be
wrong and unacceptable that people should have to live under a regime that lacks the
legitimacy that characterises a MV.
If, on the other hand, the legitimacy that figures in MV is more empirical in
character, its normative significance will be less direct. It will contribute to the general
notion that to be a MVan arrangement has to be one that the interested parties accept,
albeit often with reservations and some reluctance, and the greater the degree of
empirical legitimacy that a MV enjoys, the better it will function as a MV. But
legitimacy will be instrumentally rather than intrinsically significant; it will have value
because it facilitates the goods that MV makes possible, especially the goods of peace
and security.
In some measure, Horton himself leaves the issue of whether the political theory of
MV should be normative in purpose as an open question and one that is subsumed by
the larger issue of what should be the character and aim of the realist political theory
that he and others are seeking to develop (2010a, 444–6). However, the burden of his
published remarks is that his political theory of MV is not straightforwardly normative
in purpose. He accepts that the idea of MV will contain an element of normativity
simply because so many of the concepts central to politics, such as ‘coercion’ and
‘legitimacy’, are permeated with normativity. But to acknowledge that the political
theory of MV will inevitably be, like any other political theory, ‘normatively inflected’
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is not to accept that it should be directly prescriptive in purpose. While he does not rule
out altogether the possibility that realist political theory might be prescriptive, he is
more inclined to doubt that such prescription is consistent with the realist’s scepticism
about the capacity of political theory to guide the conduct of politics. His political
theory of MV, he says, ‘does not aim to provide much by way of practical guidance’
(2010a, 445). It would seem to be more interpretative than normative in purpose. In that
respect his theory of MV differs from that of some others, who share in the prescriptive
purpose of mainstream liberal political theory even though they are more modest than
the likes of Rawls in what they recommend (e.g. Neal 1997; McCabe 2010). Horton’s
account of MVaims not merely to invest the recommendations of liberal moralism with
a more realistic content; it is part of a larger endeavour to reshape the character and
purpose of political theory.
3 Why Modus Vivendi?
Before turning to assess Horton’s thinking on MV, there is a further question we might
ask about it. Why does he think that MV should figure so pre-eminently in our thinking
about the nature and potentialities of political life? The answer is not self-evident, nor
need it be the same for all proponents of MV. Apart from Horton, the political theorist
who has done most to develop the idea of MV is John Gray (2000). Gray’s advocacy of
MV is the offspring of his commitment to value pluralism. ‘Value pluralism’ here does
not describe the mere fact that different people possess different and often conflicting
ideas of what is valuable. Rather it is a meta-ethical thesis about the nature of value
itself: the thesis that values are themselves conflicting, sometimes uncombinable and
frequently incommensurable, so that we can identify no one value (such as human
utility) as the supreme value, nor any particular configuration of values as the uniquely
right configuration. When that thesis is applied to forms of life, it entails that there are
many different good forms of life, none of which can be identified as better than the
rest, and not all of which can be realised in a single life or in a single community. For
Gray, MV is the best we can do in politics, because political institutions have to cope
with the diversity of commitments and forms of life that are the inevitable consequence
of value pluralism, but also because value pluralism applies to political institutions
themselves – there is no one political system that we can identify as uniquely just or
uniquely legitimate.
While Horton has some sympathy with value pluralism as a thesis about the
conflictual nature of values, he dissents from Gray’s efforts to make it the foundation
for MV (2007, 43–49; 2011a 123). Value pluralism is a controversial thesis and its
claims about the nature of value are at odds with those of many other prominent types
of moral thinking, such as religiously-based moral beliefs. Rather than providing a
plausible and realistic foundation for MV, it belongs in the mix of different and
conflicting views for which MV has to provide. Horton also faults Gray for
taking too little account of disagreement over the basic distinction between
good and bad and for neglecting sources of conflict other than value pluralism,
such as differences of interest.
Gray does exhibit some of the scepticism that lies at the root of Horton’s commit-
ment to MV but only insofar as value pluralism exposes certain aspirations and ways of
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thinking as wrong-headed. Horton’s scepticism is closer to the ground and more
thorough-going. He locates the political theory of MV within the sceptical and anti-
utopian school of thought that he and others describe as ‘realism’. Why? One answer
would seem to be modesty about what we can expect from human beings. We may
glimpse a better world but we err if we suppose that human beings are capable of
sustaining it. Real people will never match Rawls’s idealised citizens; they are not
capable of the highly moralised and consistently just conduct that Rawls requires of
them. For Horton, familiar truths about ‘human weakness and fallibility’ make the case
for the politics of MV more powerfully than does Gray’s value pluralism (2007, 55;
2010a, 434).
However, that is not where the only or perhaps the main burden of his case lies.
Another factor that is important in his thinking is contingency (Horton 2005, 31; 2010a
436, 439–40, 2011a, 124). In politics we never face clear, clean circumstances and we
never start from a blank slate. We always inherit a particular context and particular
circumstances of which we can only make the best. The sheer contingency, untidiness
and incongruity of those circumstances preclude the realisation of neat and symmetrical
models of the just society.
But that is not the whole story either. As we have already noticed, Horton reserves a
special scepticism, sometimes little short of contempt, for ‘moralism’ and particularly
‘liberal moralism’, which is the pejorative label he uses to describe the deontological
liberalism of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Ronald Dworkin and Brian Barry and, we might
add, Gerry Cohen, Amartya Sen, Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon and Thomas Pogge;
in fact, a very large chunk of the major names that have emerged in Anglo-American
political philosophy during the last half century.
What is wrong with ‘moralism’? Part of the answer lies in elements of Horton’s
thought that we have already touched on: over-idealised expectations of human beings
and over-idealised and insufficiently particularised conceptions of the circumstances
that we confront in politics. But there are other answers too. One is that moral theory, or
a moral theory, simply will not provide all of the answers to all of the issues and
circumstances we confront, especially in politics. Horton appears to think that we
exhaust the resources of morality sooner than the moralists think and we are quickly
reduced to dealing with issues in non-moral or amoral terms, or at least in terms on
which moral theories are indeterminate or ambiguous. Another answer is that morality
is itself so frequently a matter of dispute that, rather than providing the solution, it
forms part of the problem. The Rawlsian solution to disagreement is to resort to
principles of right that stand separately from conflicting conceptions of the good and
the comprehensive doctrines from which those conceptions derive, so that we can use a
higher level political morality to manage the conflicts that occur lower down the moral
hierarchy. Horton’s response is to observe that there is no higher level morality that is
immune from conflict. Disagreement can go all the way up as well as all the way down;
there are no common or higher-level principles to which people can reliably turn to
resolve their disagreements (2003, 2010b). They have simply to make the best of the
conflictual circumstances in which they find themselves and to do so with whatever
resources they can find within those circumstances rather than by looking outside or
above them.
Against that background, it is unsurprising that, whilst Horton makes legitimacy a
feature of MV, it is a legitimacy that is highly particular to the context and culture of
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each society and highly dependent on what, as a matter of fact, the relevant population
finds acceptable. It is equally unsurprising that morality figures in such a muted and
secondary way in his account of MV. His thinking on MV may not dispense with
morality altogether (2007, 52–3; 2010a, 441), but it is certainly intended as an antidote
to moralism.
4 MV and Actual Political Systems
Horton’s thesis on MV is so broad-ranging and raises such large and fundamental issues
about the nature of politics and political theory that my comments on it in the remainder
of this article will be no more than limited, piecemeal and inconclusive. The general
burden of what I have to say questions whether Horton is overly sceptical about what is
possible both in politics and in political theory.
One way of testing Horton’s claims about MV might be to examine how far current
political systems conform to his model of MV. MV is especially associated with conflict
and the resolution of conflict and there are plenty of instances in the modern world of
regimes that bear the marks of the divisions and disputes they have had to manage. We
might think, for example, of the consociational arrangements that characterise the
Belgian and Swiss political systems, or the form that federalism has assumed in
Canada in response to division between the French and English speaking
populations, or the way in which representation in the Fijian Parliament has
been structured to reflect the country’s different ethnic communities. The
power-sharing arrangement that has existed in Northern Ireland since 1998 is
a classic instance of a MV that has secured a fragile and hard-won peace in a
context of bitter and previously bloody conflict. Horton himself cites the Good
Friday Agreement as a paradigm instance of MV (2011a, 132–4).
However, my understanding of Horton’s political theory of MV is that it is not
intended to provide only for the special circumstances of ‘deeply divided’ societies,
such as Northern Ireland. The model of MV is meant also to capture the character of
political systems that exist in more homogeneous societies and whose politics assume a
more ordinary workaday character. If the reality is that we can never do better than a
MV, it must be the case that no actually existing regime has managed to be more than a
MV, although it may fall short of a MV as in the case of tyrannies and failed states. Is
that the reality of our world? This is where lack of precision in the idea of MV becomes
a problem. MV requires there to be some consensus, but not too much, otherwise we
shall go beyond a MV. So how do we test the empirical claim implicit in Horton’s
political theory of MV? One possibility is to go back to the ideas of disagreement,
dissatisfaction and compromise. A population is involved in a MV if its members
accept a political arrangement and bestow upon it some measure of legitimacy, but still
regard as less than wholly satisfactory and as falling short of what there really ought to
be. If they come to regard the arrangement as wholly right, if they are fully or very
content with it, if they see no reason to change it even if they could, then they would
seem to have arrived at an arrangement that is more than a MV.
If that is the test, and if we look around at reasonably stable European societies like
Britain and Denmark and nowadays Germany, and at the US – the kind of societies
Rawls means to address in his theory of justice – it is not clear that they are accurately
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described as MV. That is not to say that they match Rawls’s model of a just society but
only that, as a matter of fact, consensus on the basic structure of the political system
seems to be broader and deeper than is exhibited by the parties to Horton’s MV. It is
perhaps rare for every aspect of a society’s basic structure to be entirely free from
dispute. Think, for example, of disagreements over the electoral system and the
possibility of Scottish independence in Britain. But that sort of particularised dissensus
can exist alongside much that is settled and undisputed.
Another factor that is relevant to the match between the political world and Horton’s
account of MV is the level of a society’s politics at which MV is supposed to exist.
Most discussions of MV, including Horton’s, contemplate MVat the very foundation of
a society and that is the sort of MV to which my comments have been addressed. But
Horton also discusses MV in relation to the Rushdie Affair and the issue of abortion
(2003, 17–21; 2007, 53) and those issues move us more into the realm of ordinary
politics. Certainly the more one ascends from constitutional fundamentals to ordinary
everyday political issues, the harder it becomes to deny the reality of disagreement,
dispute and contestation. If we describe those ordinary political differences and their
resolution through established political processes as manifestations of MV, MV will be
an omnipresent feature of politics. But if we make MV synonymous with politics itself,
we deprive it of any significant independent meaning. That is not to deny that there
may be particular political issues that divide a society so deeply that they are not easily
contained by the society’s ordinary political processes, and any would-be resolution of
them will rank, for the divided parties, as no more than a MV. But that is very different
from the ordinary run of political disputes and disagreements that all sides accept are
rightly resolved through their political system’s decision-making processes. If, howev-
er, we reposition MVat a more fundamental level so that its concerns are constitutional,
I am not persuaded that what we find in our world is, always and everywhere,
arrangements that are, for those whom they govern, never more than a MV.
Yet that verdict may result from subjecting MV to the wrong sort of test. Although
conflict amongst a population figures prominently in Horton’s account of MV, that
conflict may need to be neither persistent nor current. A society may have worked out
institutions for dealing with its divisions long ago and its current generation of citizens
may be heir to none of the discontent or sense of compromise that has accompanied the
historical development of those institutions. They may accept their inherited political
system as simply ‘their’ way of doing things, which they embrace with little or no
dissatisfaction and perhaps with little or no reflection. Nevertheless, Horton is still
likely to regard their political system as a MV, which suggests that its character as a MV
turns not on how deeply and thoroughly the relevant population accepts it, but on the
nature of the arrangement itself. It is the product of all sorts of historical circumstances,
contingencies and compromises and it remains a creature of its origins. That, rather
than instantiations of political theory or abstract principle, is the reality of political
systems. Just as Michael Oakeshott held that in politics, whatever we may think we do,
we never actually do any other than pursue intimations, so Horton’s claim may be that,
no matter how we may think of political arrangements, they never actually amount to
more than MV. And just as Oakeshott understood ideological politics to rest upon a
misconception of the nature of politics and of itself, so Horton seems to believe the
general run of contemporary political philosophy, especially liberal moralism, to rest
upon a misconception of the nature of the political reality for which it seeks to provide.
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5 Modus Vivendi and Contemporary Political Theory
Is Horton right to be quite so dismissive of the type of political philosophy that he brands
‘liberal moralism’? Much of his critical fire is directed at the work of Rawls, under-
standably since Rawls is generally recognised as the principal standard bearer for what
Horton calls liberal moralism. I begin therefore by commenting on Rawls’s political
philosophy in relation to Horton’s critique. The issue I want to take up, however, is not
whether the substance of Rawls’s argument is correct but whether the kind of exercise he
is engaged in is so remote from political reality as to be wrong-headed and pointless.
It is easy to exaggerate the extent to which Rawls’s political thinking is idealistic. In
many ways, Rawls, especially the ‘later’ Rawls, is a very conventional thinker. Recall
that his political liberalism and his political conception of justice are based on funda-
mental ideas that he takes to be already present in the public culture of democratic
societies – ideas of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, of persons as free and equal,
and of well-orderedness (Rawls 1993). He has primarily in mind the public culture of
the US, but I understand him also to include the public cultures of other societies that
are normally described as liberal democratic. He ‘works up’ his principles of justice
from fundamental ideas that are already present in those public cultures. Horton,
unsurprisingly, contrasts Rawls’s thinking unfavourably with Oakeshott’s politics of
scepticism (2005, 31–2), but Rawls’s own approach has an Oakeshottian character – he
understands himself to be pursuing what is already intimated in the public cultures of
the societies for which his political conception of justice is designed. Rawls’s account
of a just international order (1999) is even more strikingly conventional and limited in
ambition than is his theory of justice for a liberal democratic polity. He describes the
just order that he sketches for the international world as a ‘realistic utopia’, but it has
struck many commentators, particularly those with more cosmopolitan inclinations, as
decidedly more realistic than utopian (cf. Martin and Reidy 2006).
One thing that encourages the perception of Rawls’s thinking as idealistic is the
distinction he makes between ideal and non-ideal theory and his representation of his
own work as primarily an exercise in ideal theory. The very notion that there is scope
for a distinction between the ideal and the non-ideal in politics is often scorned by
realists, who believe that it betrays either naivety or a wilful and pointless failure to
confront the realities of the political world. Horton, himself, observes that the distinc-
tion is one ‘of which the political theory of modus vivendi is naturally suspicious, and
for which it has little use’ (2011a, 126). However, the purpose of the distinction is
easily misunderstood and actually has very little to do with ‘utopianism’ as that term is
ordinarily understood. It is designed to distinguish between two sorts of question:
(i) What should be the basic structure of our society, whether it be a domestic society
or the international society of peoples? What should be the basic rules and
arrangements of that society? That is the concern of ideal theory.
(ii) What should we do when things go wrong – when people (either ordinary citizens
or their governments) do not comply with those rules and arrangements? That is
the concern of non-ideal theory. For Rawls, non-ideal theory is primarily about
non-compliance; it is about issues such as crime, punishment and civil disobedi-
ence in the domestic case, and outlaw regimes, ‘burdened societies’, and just war
in the international case.
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The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is not therefore a distinc-
tion between more idealistic and more realistic political theory. Rather, it
badges two different sorts of issue and signals a division of labour in our
moral and political thinking.
The ‘ideal’ of ideal theory need not therefore be highly ‘idealistic’ and utopian in
character. On the contrary, the ideal of ideal theory can take full account of the limits
that constrain what we might reasonably expect to achieve. It is perfectly possible, for
example, to apply the ideal/non-ideal distinction to a thinker like Hobbes, whose name
is often associated with MV (e.g. Neal 1997, 185–201). His Leviathan is primarily an
exercise in ideal theory; it sets out the type of regime that human beings would ideally
construct. It also describes the type of regime with which they would always comply if
they were fully and constantly enlightened about their self-interest. Unfortunately, some
will be foolish or ignorant, or they will be led astray by false doctrines, and so the
sovereign, as well as playing the role ascribed to him in ideal theory, has to cope with
the non-ideal circumstance of non-compliance. But the issue of what sort of authority
there should be and what sort of role it should perform is for Hobbes, in the first
instance, an issue of ideal theory. The fact that we would never describe Hobbes’s
political prescriptions as utopian does not make them non-ideal in Rawls’s sense.
For Rawls, the idea of a MV forms part of his story about the development of an
overlapping consensus on the principles of a just society. That story is most readily
understood as one about how the political toleration of religious differences in western
societies – primarily differences within Christianity – evolved in the centuries follow-
ing the Reformation. It begins with a MV, a mere stand-off grounded in people’s
weariness with war and bloodshed but, over time, the settlement develops into some-
thing more. People come to think of religious freedom as a right and they increasingly
abandon the idea that political power should be used as an instrument of religion. So we
have a broad consensus developing that public provision for people’s religious differ-
ences should be governed by principles of freedom and equality. Although presented in
a simplified form, that story is quite plausible. Most people in western societies who
have a religious faith do not now view religious freedom and equality as poor
substitutes for the confessional state; it is not for them a reluctant compromise. It is
how things really ought to be in a religiously diverse society. Not everything has been
settled; issues such as abortion and marriage and limits on free expression remain
matters of dispute amongst those of faith and of no faith. But the commitment to
religious freedom, which Rawls treats as a ‘settled conviction’ (1993, 8), and the
wrongness of using political power to impose or to promote a particular faith or
denomination, are now matters of widespread consensus.
It is fair to add that the breadth and depth of consensus Rawls hopes for from his model
citizens set the stakes high and arguably unnecessarily high. First, his overlapping
consensus is a consensus of ‘comprehensive doctrines’, which include moral and philo-
sophical as well as religious doctrines, and the consensus that has developed around the
proper relationship between religion and political power does not yet have a clear
equivalent for non-religious doctrines. Secondly, Rawls often speaks as though he expects
his citizens not only to embrace his conception of justice as a free-standing political
conception, but also to find positive reason for endorsing it within their different com-
prehensive doctrines. That is probably both implausible and unnecessary. I suspect, for
instance, that the great majority of people living in western liberal democracies who have
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religious beliefs make little if any connection between those beliefs and the basic political
structure of the societies in which they live, although some do. Thirdly, the stability that
preoccupies Rawls is intellectual stability as much as political stability. For example,
amongst the comprehensive doctrines that concern him are utilitarianism and Kantianism
and he frets over whether the adherents of those doctrines will be able, without inconsis-
tency, to embrace his political conception of justice. To date there has been little reason to
translate that philosophical worry into a political worry; the destabilising social conflicts
with which politicians have had to cope have not, so far, included those coming from the
massed ranks of discontented utilitarians and Kantians. On the other hand, these critical
observations on Rawls’s ambitions for an overlapping consensus are not necessarily grist
to Horton’s mill. They suggest that getting people who possess different comprehensive
doctrines to accept a common set of political principles may be less difficult in practice
than Rawls makes it in theory.
There are, however, other sorts of division, other forms of pluralism, that create real
problems of stability which may be major concerns for the theorist of MV but in which
Rawls shows little interest. These are divisions and conflicts that arise out of differences
of nationality, ethnicity, language, and also religion in cases where it is different
religious identities rather than different religious doctrines that foment social and
political conflict. In dealing with those differences, MV may be very much to the
point. Here I want to comment briefly on how the differences between doctrinal conflict
and identity conflict relate to Horton’s critique of Rawls.
Rawls is concerned with comprehensive doctrines because those doctrines have
normative content. If they were truly comprehensive they would have a normative
content that covered every aspect of life, including politics. In fact, none is fully
comprehensive and so we find Rawls using the oxymoronic phrase ‘partial compre-
hensive doctrine’. But even a partial comprehensive doctrine may contain norms that
prescribe or imply a political order different from Rawls’s political conception of
justice. That is why he has to worry about whether his political conception of justice
can secure a consensus amongst people who embrace different comprehensive doc-
trines. But, where differences are differences of identity, they are not necessarily
accompanied by the sort of doctrinal differences that create the potential for conflict
over what is a just political system. Identity differences may be no less problematic for
political stability than doctrinal differences, and they may often be more problematic,
but they are problematic in a different way.
Secondly, insofar as identity differences generate conflict, that conflict may have a
different political focus. Consider the case of nationality and Northern Ireland. In the
history of Ireland, conflicts of religious belief have been extremely important but the
recent Troubles have not been primarily conflicts over religious doctrine; IRA and
Loyalist paramilitaries have not killed members of one another’s community, and often
members of their own, because they disagreed over matters of theology. Simplifying
drastically, the recent conflict has been between different national identities which are
closely associated with different religious identities. Loyalists and unionists have
wanted Ulster to remain part of the UK; republicans and nationalists have wanted
Ulster to form part of a united Ireland. What the conflict has not been about is the sort
of political system under which they should live. It was fundamentally about what their
political unit should be, rather than about Rawls’s concern – what their favoured unit’s
political system should be. There is no reason to believe that unionists and nationalists
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wish to live under fundamentally different sorts of political system, any more than do
the citizens of Great Britain and the citizens of the Republic of Ireland. Thus, the
disagreements and conflicts that concern the political theorist of MV, or to which a
particular MV is addressed, need not be those that preoccupy Rawls.
Given the realities of the contemporary world, the political theorist of MV might
well criticise Rawls for focusing on the wrong sort of pluralism, and some do. Claudia
Mills, for example, argues that Rawls’s neglect of issues of race, gender and ethnicity
helps him to overlook the case for MV (Mills 2000, 203) and Jacob Levy suggests that,
when we add ethnic, cultural and linguistic pluralism to religious pluralism, the case for
MV is more compelling than Rawls recognises (cf. Levy 2007, 190–3). It is certainly
true that the principles Rawls develops for dealing justly with a plurality of compre-
hensive doctrines are often not easily re-applied to other forms of pluralism. On the
other hand, that is to point out the limits of Rawls’s endeavour rather than to establish
its irrelevance or impracticability, and issues of racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic
difference, and differences of national identity, have hardly been neglected by other
liberal political philosophers.
Horton does, however, charge liberal moralism with ignoring other major questions
and he links that neglect to its moralistic preoccupations and its failure to allow its
agenda to be shaped by the real world of politics. The many real-life political subjects
on which, he complains, liberal moralism has had little if anything to say include
political judgement, leadership, representation, political responsibility, what is politi-
cally possible, and how the transition from currently existing societies to the much
vaunted just society might be effected (2009; 2010a 437, 445). For some of these
subjects, e.g. political representation, bibliographies might be compiled in defence of
liberal political theory, but for others the charge is hard to deny. Liberal political
theory’s enthusiasms are undoubtedly accompanied by blind spots. It may be, however,
that liberal political philosophy is sometimes relatively silent on particular subjects as a
consequence of the very modesty of ambition that Horton urges upon it. Take the case
that Horton has complained about at greatest length: political leadership (2009). It may
be that liberal and other normative forms of political theory have said little about
leadership, not because their practitioners have failed to recognise its significance in
politics (could they really have been so purblind?) but because, as normative political
theorists, they have recognised that their competence to say much of consequence on
that subject is very limited. If they were to attempt to instruct presidents, prime
ministers and other politicians in the art of leadership or in the exercise of political
judgement, Horton would scorn their presumption and naivety – and rightly so.
Normative political theory’s uneven concern with political issues may reflect not its
own unworldliness and self-obsession but rather its recognition that, while there are
some aspects of politics to which it can make significant and valuable contributions,
there are others on which it has little competence.
Of course, that takes us onto the question of what the task of political theory should be.
As we have seen, Horton gives little normative or prescriptive purpose to the political
theory of MV, which presumably means that he has little, if any, normative or prescriptive
aspirations for political theory in general. But if political theory ceases to be normative in
concern, even though it might continue to be ‘normatively inflected’, it is difficult to see
what substantial purpose it might have. It can, of course, continue to engage in conceptual
analysis, but Horton’s recasting of political theory in a realist mode seems to project more
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for it than that. It is just not clear what that ‘more’ might be. Take the case of leadership
again. In attacking liberal moralism for neglecting leadership, Horton implies that lead-
ership is a subject on which political theorists can and should have something significant
to say. But what might that be? It is difficult to think of an answer that would not entail
political theorists usurping the domains of other sorts of scholar, such as empirical
political scientists or political sociologists or political psychologists, and surely the last
thing we want is a return to the ‘armchair political science’ of many decades ago, when
people purported to tell us all about the political world while never leaving their studies to
investigate it. There are issues relating to leadership that are obvious topics for political
theory such as the issue of ‘dirty hands’, but that issue is both ‘much discussed’ and
normative through and through, and it does not cease to be normative just because we
recognise the inadequacy of jejune forms of moralism.
6 Conclusion
My purpose in this article has not been to debunk the case that Horton makes for MV.
Quite the contrary, his articulation of the nature of MVand of the need to recognise MV
as a central feature of political life constitutes one of his most significant contributions
to political theory. Although he is not alone in defending MV, he has done more than
anyone else to investigate and develop the substance of that idea. He also gives a
compelling case for understanding the political world through the idea of MV and
makes sense of the reality that chaos and repression are not the only alternatives to a
just, or nearly just, society. His emphasis on contingency, compromise and circum-
stance is a much needed reminder that we have to take the world as we find it and make
the best of what we find. Unlike Plato’s philosopher-rulers, we cannot begin by
scraping the canvas clean and, even if we could, we could not complete the picture
by using the resources of political theory alone.
The major doubt I harbour is whether Horton’s understanding of the political world
in terms of MV is really as corrosive of contemporary political philosophy, including
‘liberal moralism’, as he appears to believe. Do we have to be so downbeat about the
politics of MV that the standard concerns of political philosophy evaporate into
irrelevance? It is hard to accept that the issues a political philosopher like Rawls takes
up – the freedoms that should characterise a liberal society, the just distribution of
income and wealth, the proper scope of political power, etc. – are not real political
issues or that carefully considered analysis and argument on those issues is of little
practical relevance to how we should organise our political lives. Even a MV can be
better or worse, more or less just. Indeed, if we cleanse the term ‘modus vivendi’ of the
pejorative associations Rawls attaches to it, it requires no great stretch of usage to
describe his own political conception of justice as an exercise in MV – an effort to work
out a ‘way of living together’ that the members of a plural society have reason to accept
is fair. The ‘idealised’ method he uses is not idealised in a way that deprives its
outcomes of any evident application to the societies in which we live.
However, Horton’s scepticism about normative political theory extends far beyond
Rawls and his theory of justice. The nature of his critique of liberal moralism suggests
that his scepticism takes in all other forms of political theory that are significantly
normative in purpose. I remain baffled by the notion that politics is so sui generis that
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(what is sometimes called) ‘practical philosophy’ loses its capacity to be practical when
it turns to politics. Horton is, of course, right to observe that political theory has a
tendency to become insular and to feed off itself (2009, 18), but that sort of disciplinary
introversion is perhaps an inescapable hazard of academic life. If we turn to economics
or sociology or ‘IR’, we find disciplines that are no less introverted and self-absorbed.
But the basic normative questions that drive contemporary political philosophy are real
questions and it is hard to see how, even in the political world of MV, they can become
unreal. If political philosophers cease to examine them, they will not go away; and they
will not go away precisely because they are pressing practical questions. Others will
still try to answer them and will probably do so even less adequately.
Acknowledgement An earlier version of this article was presented to a Forum on the work of JohnHorton held
at the University of Keele in 2012. I am grateful to the participants in the Forum for their comments and especially
to John Horton and Ian O’Flynn. Thanks too for their comments to this journal’s three anonymous referees.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Gray, J. (2000). Two faces of liberalism. Cambridge: Polity.
Horton, J. (2003). Rawls, public reason and the limits of liberal justification. Contemporary Political Theory,
2(1), 5–23.
Horton, J. (2005). A qualified defence of Oakeshott’s politics of scepticism. European Journal of Political
Theory, 4(1), 23–36.
Horton, J. (2007). John Gray and the political theory of modus vivendi. In J. Horton & G. Newey (Eds.), The
political theory of John Gray (pp. 43–58). London: Routledge.
Horton, J. (2009). Political leadership in contemporary political theory. In J. Femia, A. Köröskényi, & G.
Slomp (Eds.), Political leadership in liberal and democratic theory (pp. 11–30). Exeter: Imprint
Academic.
Horton, J. (2010a). Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of modus vivendi. European Journal of
Political Theory, 9(4), 431–448.
Horton, J. (2010b). Reasonable disagreement. In M. Dimova-Cookson & P. M. R. Stirk (Eds.),
Multiculturalism and moral conflict (pp. 58–74). London: Routledge.
Horton, J. (2010c). Political obligation (second ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Horton, J. (2011a). Modus vivendi and religious accommodation. In M. Mookherjee (Ed.), Toleration and
recognition in an age of religious pluralism (pp. 121–136). Dordrecht: Springer.
Horton, J. (2011b). Why the traditional conception of toleration still matters. Critical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy, 14(3), 289–305.
Horton, J. (2012). Political legitimacy, justice and consent. Critical Review of International Social and
Political Philosophy, 15(2), 129–148.
Hume, D. (1963). Of the first principles of government. In His essays: moral, political and literary (pp. 29–
34). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jones, P., & O’Flynn, I. (2013). Can a compromise be fair? Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 12(2), 115–
135.
Levy, J. (2007). Contextualism, constitutionalism, and modus vivendi approaches. In A. Laden & D. Owen
(Eds.), Multiculturalism and political theory (pp. 173–197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martin, R., & Reidy, D. (Eds.). (2006). Rawls’s law of peoples: a realistic utopia? Oxford: Blackwell.
McCabe, D. (2010). Modus vivendi liberalism, theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mills, C. (2000). Not a mere modus vivendi: the bases of allegiance to the just state. In V. Davion & C. Wolf
(Eds.), The idea of a political liberalism (pp. 190–203). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Philosophia
Neal, P. (1997). Liberalism and its discontents. London: Macmillan.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999). The law of peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Philosophia
